City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

5-2015

The Odyssey of North Korean Defectors: Issues and Problems in
the Migration Process
You Gene Kim
Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1009
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

THE ODYSSEY OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS:
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN THE MIGRATON PROCESS

by

YOU GENE KIM

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York
2015

i
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the dissertation
requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

Mehdi Bozorgmehr

Date

Thesis Advisor

Matthew K. Gold

Date

Executive Officer

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ii

Abstract
THE ODYSSEY OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS:
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN THE MIGRATION PROCESS

By
You Gene Kim
Advisor: Professor Mehdi Bozorgmehr
Since the Great Famine in the 1990s, many North Koreans have emigrated in search of better lives
in South Korea or other countries. However, they face hardship and peril in every phase of this odyssey.
In China, North Korean defectors suffer from the constant threat of being arrested and deported by the
Chinese authorities. Furthermore, the Chinese government has refused to grant refugee status to North
Korean defectors because of its desire to maintain positive diplomatic relations with North Korea.
Consequently, most of the defectors aim to go to South Korea, though some young and educated North
Koreans prefer the United States because of the possibility for better educational opportunities. In this
thesis, I investigate the various issues and problems faced by North Koreans during their arduous journeys,
which are marked by constant legal status changes. They start as defectors (illegal migrants), then become
asylum seekers, and finally refugees. Even those who are fortunate enough to become citizens in the new
host countries experience substantial difficulties in adjusting to new environments. North Korean refugee
issues are important political and social concerns for China, South Korea, and the United States, but they
also have implications for the entire world. Although this thesis mainly examines the problems North
Koreans confront during their journeys, it also explores some solutions to the various challenges faced
during resettlement. China should honor its commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention by granting
refugee status to defectors and not returning them to their homeland. The South Korean government should
acknowledge that North Koreans experience difficulties adapting to South Korean society and adjust their
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policies accordingly. Based on the spirit of NKHRA, the United States should not hesitate to accept the
influx of North Korean refugees. Ultimately, this crisis can only be solved through international
cooperation.
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The Odyssey of North Korean Defectors:
Issues and Problems in the Migration Process
Introduction
Korea has a five thousand year-old history and its people have been composed of
homogenous ethnic group in a single nation state for more than 1,300 years. However, since the
end of World War II, Korea has been divided into two states. Under this geopolitical division,
South Korea has evolved into a democratic country with an open-door policy towards foreign
countries, while North Korea has remained isolated under the influence of communism and the
dictatorship of a single family. As a consequence, South Korea has become an affluent and welldeveloped nation. By contrast, North Korea has continued to suffer from poverty and political
polarization, and it has become one of the most secluded and aggressive nations in the world.
After the end of the Korean Civil War (1950-1953), a relatively small number of North
Koreans attempted to flee to South Korea or other countries for economic, political, and religious
reasons. During the 1980s, the number of defectors sharply increased due to the deterioration of
the North Korean economy. In the 1990s, North Korea was confronted with the Great Famine,
which motivated a mass exodus from North Korea to China. “Chronic food shortage, political
repression, and the continuing weakness of the economy have driven thousands of North Koreans
to cross the border into China’s Northeastern Provinces” (Chang et al. 2008: 1). Some North
Korean defectors escaped to China with the intention of traveling to a third country located in
Southeast Asia in search of asylum, with their final destinations being South Korea or countries in
Europe and North America.
However, China has not protected the defectors who have crossed the border. On the
contrary, China refused to grant legal refugee status to North Korean defectors and they consider
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the defectors as illegal migrants. In worst cases, if the defectors are caught in China, they are
repatriated to North Korea and face harassment, imprisonment, and even death penalty. In this
context, China merely serves as a transit route to the final destination. After temporarily staying in
China, many defectors have the intention of making one more stopover in South East Asia such as
Thailand, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, or Cambodia to secure asylum from the host countries before
continuing their journey to another country. Most of the defectors want to eventually settle in South
Korea. However, some other defectors choose to go to countries in Europe and North America.
Overall, “most of the defectors want to resettle in South Korea, though younger and better educated
defectors have a great inclination to prefer the United States as a final destination” (Chang et al.
2008: 1). During the course of their journeys, North Korean defectors have to overcome unbearable
hardships until they reach their final destination. After resettlement, they still have to cope with
the difficulties of adjustment to their new life in the host countries.
Data
I decided not to interview North Korean defectors in the U.S. because most of them are
hesitant to share their personal experiences with a stranger out of constant traumatic fears.
Furthermore, many of them are used to hiding their identities. Instead, I chose to write a literature
analysis based on narratives, published literary works, and Korean-based television broadcasts.
Fortunately, narratives in TED Talks helped me in shaping the historical background and the reality
of the painstaking process of crossing the border in North Korea. In addition, the archives in LiNK
(Liberty of North Korea) provided rich resources of personal narratives and updates on individual’s
life stories. Furthermore, Blaine Harden’s work Escape form Camp 14 highlighted the experiences
of a defector, Dong-hyuck Shin, and his arduous journey from North Korea to America. In
particular, Korean-based television broadcasts have provided various contents to inform and
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educate people about the lives of North Koreans. The broadcasts include documentaries heavily
focused on reporting facts about North Korean defection and the talk shows covering more
humanistic and accessible components of defectors’ lives.
Organization
Overall, this research is designed to explore four major components of North Korean
defectors’ resettlement journeys in relation to social, political, psychological struggles when they
cross the border between North Korea and China and arrive at their final destination in South Korea
or the United States. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, I have divided this research
paper into six parts, along with those four components based on geographical sequences in North
Korea, China, South Korea, and America.
To begin, I will briefly introduce the background history of North Korea and explain my data
and methodology. For data analysis, I largely depend on the statistical data from Korean and
American governments and narrative interviews from TED Talks lectures, documentary video
clips on LiNK (Liberty in North Korea), and literary resources. In the next stage, I will define who
North Korean defectors are. I will then move onto the geographical transition of North Korean
defectors.
There are four major locations where the defectors temporarily stay and finally resettle. First,
I will describe the process of crossing the border into China. As North Korean defectors are not
allowed to have refugee status in China, eventually they realize China is not a right place to resettle
permanently. Therefore, they embark on another adventure.
After that, I will discuss the socioeconomic and psychological hardships experienced by
defectors during their resettlement in South Korea. While trying to adjust to a new life style, they
often experience difficulties regarding the ideological and political gap between South Korea and
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North Korea, which have resulted from seventy years of separation.
I dedicate more pages in talking about the U.S. than the other geographical locations to
emphasize my hypothesis that increasingly more North Koreans are coming to the U.S. because of
the strong “pull factors” of migration. Although most North Korean defectors decide to go to South
Korea, quite a few of them prefer the U.S. because of better economic and educational
opportunities. They simply wish to resettle in the U.S. for a better life. However, there are issues
and problems among North Korean refugees in the U.S. while they adapt to their new lives. In the
future, the U.S. government will have to formulate policies on North Korean refugees, along with
other sociological aspects of migration and assimilation of North Koreans in the United States.
For my conclusion, I put emphasis on how to enhance North Koreans’ political and social
status in the host countries of both South Korea and the United States. I will also bring up solutions
for economic and psychological problems of North Korean refugees after their resettlement.
No one can predict what will happen in North Korea. North Korean regime may collapse
in the near future, and the exodus of people will bring up complex issues of mass migration in
South Korea as well as in China and the United States. The international community should pay
attention to the prospect of North Korean migration in the near future.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
On the whole, this paper deals with the various issues and problems that confront North Korean
defectors while they move from North Korea via China to their final destinations to South Korea
or the Unites States. Their journey is full of challenges, which bring up questions of reasons and
motivations, but also address the need for solutions. To this end, South Korean scholars have
conducted various researches over the subjects of integration and adaptation issues in South Korea
as well as the North Korean refugee issues in China. Yet, research on North Korean refugees in
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the U.S. has been severely limited, and very little is known about social issues and other aspects
of their lives in this “Land of Opportunity.” In fact, the vast majority of data focuses only on
political concerns of U.S. policies towards North Koreans, such as nuclear proliferation.
Above all, my paper comprehensively deals with the North Koreans’ issues in four different
regions: North Korea, China, South Korea, and the United States. Thus, my research questions are
formulated according to the order of my literature review, which was categorized by those four
different countries where the issues of North Koreans are raised. Correspondingly, the research
questions are as follows:


What makes North Koreans escape their home country?



What are the motives of defection?



How do they settle in China without legal status?



What are the challenges and difficulties of North Koreans in China?



Why do they have to choose a third country to arrive at their destination?



What is the process of resettlement in South Korea?



What are the issues and problems in adapting to South Korean society?



Why do some North Koreans want to move to the U.S.?



What are the issues on implementing NKHRA in the United States?



What are the difficulties in adapting a new life in the U.S.?



What lessons can be learned from U.S. policy towards Vietnamese refugees?



What are some ways to improve U.S. policy towards North Korean refugees?



What are the prospects of North Korean refugee resettlement in the U.S.?
In the following paragraphs, based on these research questions, I will generate the

hypotheses to predict the future migration and resettlement patterns of North Koreans, particularly
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in South Korea and the United States. Above all, my hypotheses will follow the stream of this
paper, which is based on the issues on four different geographical regions.
North Koreans will increasingly cross the border of China because of the accessibility of
the Internet and mobile phones in North Korean society. Thus, they will be exposed more often to
the culture of free market economy of China and South Korea.
China will enforce the repatriation (refoulement) policy harsher than before because they
want to maintain the diplomatic relationship with North Korea as a formal alley. Furthermore,
China wants to keep its political hegemony in the Far East by maintaining leverage over North
Korea. Although China signed the Refugee Convention and Protocol, they do not allow North
Korean defectors to have refugee status.
The number of North Korean defectors will increase in South Korea. However, North
Koreans in South Korea will have difficulties in adapting into the South Korean society mainly
because of the differences in ideology, culture, and even language.
More and more North Korean defectors will choose to come to the United States rather
than South Korea because of the better pull factors in economic and educational opportunities.
Many North Korean defectors in China have already recognized that they could experience harsh
discrimination in South Korean society. They also want to get away from geographical contiguity
from North Korea. There are just few reasons that more North Korean defectors will choose to
come to the U.S. instead of South Korea. As a consequence, the U.S. government will also have
to prepare for the large influx of North Koreans in the future.
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Literature Review
Due to various sensitive issues involving confidentiality, safety, and access, there are
limited primary sources regarding North Korean defectors. However, I was able to find ample
secondary primary resources such as articles, books, newspapers, and even YouTube recordings
based on studies by scholars of North Korea and its defectors. The literature and reports from the
U.S. government, the South Korean government, and related NGO’s also contributed to the
structuring of my review of relevant literature.
As indicated earlier, I will chronologically examine four geographical areas, starting from
North Korea via China to South Korea or the United States. Thus, the structure of this literature
review will parallel the body of this thesis. In most cases, North Korean defectors begin their
arduous journey by leaving North Korea, crossing either the Yalu or Tumen River, arriving in
China, and then moving on to their final destination (mostly South Korea or occasionally to the
United States). This odyssey is full of issues and problems, which have been explored and revealed
by scholars from various different fields. This research, without a doubt, has contributed to my
understanding of the issues and problems of North Korean defectors or refugees who undergo
political, social, economic, and psychological hardships throughout their seemingly endless plight.
Who are refugees?
There are diverse and complex motivations for migration. Some people move to new
countries to enhance their economic situations, while others leave their home countries to escape
from human rights abuses such as torture, persecution, armed conflict, extreme poverty, and even
death. Among those various types of migrants, refugees are defined as “people who have been
forced to leave their country because there is a war there or because of their political or religious
belief” (Newbury House Cobuild English Learner Dictionary). More specifically, in the 1951
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Refugee Conventional, UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner to Refugees) said that “a
refugee is someone who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country” (UN Refugee Agency 1967: 16). Above all, to attain refugee status,
one has to first become an asylum seeker. The following quotation clarifies the distinction between
a refugee and an asylum seeker:
Asylum seekers are people who move across borders in search of protection, but who may
not fulfill the strict criteria laid down by the 1951 Convention. Asylum seeker describes
someone who has applied for protection as a refugee and is awaiting the determination of his
or her status. Refugee is the term used to describe a person who has already been granted
protection. Asylum seekers can become refugees if the local immigration or refugee authority
d e e m s t h em a s f i t t i n g t h e i n t e rn a t i on a l d e f i ni t i o n o f r e f u ge e ( U N E S C O:
http://www.unesco.org/most/mi gration/glossar y_as ylum_seeker.htm ).
Above all, the 1951 Convention is the key legal document in defining who a refugee is. In
this respect, North Korean defectors are not simply economic migrants, as the Chinese government
constantly argues. Instead, they should be considered bona fide refugees under the definition of
the UNHCR. Article 33 of the Convention guarantees “non-refoulement”, which forbids rendering
victims of persecution to their persecutors: “No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of terrorists where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion” (The UN Refugee Agency 1967: 32). The above paragraph and block quotation
defined refugee status and the difference between refugees and asylum seekers. The following
quotation clarifies the distinction between economic migrants and refugees:
Migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve the future prospects
of themselves and their families. Refugees have to move if they are to save their lives or preserve
their freedom. They have no protection from their own state. Indeed, it is often their own
government that is threatening to persecute them. If other countries do not let them in, and do not
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help them once they are in, then they may be condemning them to death, or to an intolerable life
in the shadows, without sustenance and without rights
(UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html).
More specifically, Zolberg (1989) addresses the definitional problem of “refugee” as
follows: “Although the term ‘refugee’ has deep historical roots, its significance as a legal and
administrative category has been vastly enhanced in our own times” (Zolberg et al. 1989:3).
Zolberg further points out how UNHCR defines the term of “refugee”. According to UNHCR,
refugees have to meet certain situational requirements, including “emergency assistance,
protection, refoulement, pirate attacks on ‘boat people’ at sea, integration problems, resettlement,
repatriation” (UNHCR 1985: 17; Zolberg et al. 1989: 6). Overall, Zolberg criticizes the UNHCR
because he thinks that they are comparatively neutral about political presentation. “This is
important not only to foster a more rational refugee policy but also to ensure that well-meaning
individuals and groups do not become unwitting instruments for ends of which they would not
approve” (1989: 272). In short, the review of the literature relating to the definition of refugee is
quite essential for the development of this research because North Korean defectors ultimately
become refugees in their final stage of the migration.
Methodology
As indicated in the literature review of this paper, I gathered and analyzed the works of
scholars in relation to the general theme of North Korean migration mainly from their articles. I
also referred to the literatures and reports from the government agencies of South Korea and the
United States. In particular, some master’s theses were quite helpful in organizing the structure of
my data collection.
Overall, I collected and reviewed more than forty articles. Additionally, I read three books,
which were invaluable to my research. I specifically focused on TED Talks testimonies of young
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North Korean refugees who have successfully resettled in their new lives in America. I also read
newspaper articles about tragic experiences of North Koreans in New York City.
Secondary literature sources comprised the majority of the data collection for this thesis. I
then used the data gathered from the articles, books, government publications, reports, and
interviews and appropriately classified them into four categories: 1) North Korean issues; push
factors and defections of North Koreans, 2) China; North Korean defectors’ lives, refugee status,
and migration issues, 3) South Korea; issues and problems of integration and adaptation, 4) the
U.S.; resettlement issues and prospects of North Korean refugees, and U.S. government policy
The purpose of this study is to discover what issues North Koreans are confronted with
during the course of their journey to their final destination and, ultimately, to find the solution of
the challenges and problems of their resettlement in their new homes. I come to understand that it
is very difficult to make contact with North Koreans in the U.S. due to the scarcity of the number
of people. Besides, most of them do not want to expose themselves to the outside world because
they are worried about what North Korean authorities might do to their families left behind in
North Korea. Consequently, they tend to be withdrawn and unwilling to participate in research
projects. For this reason, as an alternative, I tried to collect data through indirect contact with North
Koreans through social media.
Social Media: TED Talks and LiNK (Liberty in North Korea)
In recent years, North Korean refugees have been introduced to various social media. This
is significant because North Korea has always been restrictive about information and
communication going in and out of the country. In particular, TED Talks have helped to bring
world-wide attention to their plight by sharing the refugees’ vivid life experiences about their long
journeys. Additionally, it has brought much-needed attention in terms of humanitarian concerns
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by manifesting the political and economic dilemmas of North Korea.
Joseph Kim and Hyunseo Lee shared their life stories via TED Talks. Both of them
confronted physical and psychological distress while they were crossing the border into China.
During the Great Famine in the 1990s, Joseph Kim (2013) used to suffer greatly. His mother was
a simple border crosser who temporarily stayed in China as a breadwinner and moved back to
North Korea to support the family. However, one day, his mother mysteriously disappeared. As a
result, he and his sister constantly struggled from extreme poverty and hunger in North Korea. In
2006, at the age of 16, he decided to cross the border with his sister. Unfortunately, he lost his
sister and became an orphan in China. He begged, stole food, and worked at illegal markets and
coalmines to survive. “While hiding in China, he met a Korean-Chinese old lady who protected
and fed him until he found help from Liberty in North Korea (LiNK), an NGO that provided more
stabilized shelter and later helped him to escape to the U.S.” (Joseph Kim 2013: TED Talks). In
2007, he officially achieved refugee status in the U.S. and started attending school. In this case,
Joseph started out as a simple border crosser, ended up becoming an economic defector, then
finally became a refugee.
Hyeonseo Lee (2013) escaped to China in 1997 and came to Seoul, South Korea in 2008.
She also shared her personal stories on TED Talks. She explained the arduous process of defection
when she was young. When she attended North Korean schools, she believed that North Korea
was the most ideal place to live in the world. She was also taught that the outside world, especially
U.S., South Korea, and Japan were all enemies. However, she was shocked when she witnessed
the people dying from hunger on the street. She was afraid that she was going to die like them, so
she decided to escape from North Korea and fled to China in 1997. When she lived in China, she
was defined as an illegal migrant. As a result, she had to cope with constant fear of disclosure of
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her identity to Chinese police officers, which were grounds for deportation to North Korea. In
order not to arouse suspicion, she made efforts to learn to speak fluent Chinese. Ten years later, in
2008, she decided to defect to South Korea. However, after she went through the resettlement, she
experienced an identity crisis while she was in South Korea. In her speech, she admitted that South
Korea and North Korea were two different nations based on contrasting socioeconomic structures.
After a while, she attended Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and became an activist.
Danny Lee (2013) documented his experience on video clip, which explains that most
young North Korean civilians who do not know any better about outside world think of North
Korea as a so-called “Socialist Paradise.” In fact, young students are brainwashed by Ju-Che
Ideology into thinking that North Korean Regime is the most powerful nation in the world. Yet,
in reality, after Kim Il Sung’s death, the North Korean regime deteriorated greatly and the civilians
suffered from extreme poverty and hunger. Under these economic circumstances, Danny Lee’s
family was no exception, and his mother became a simple border crosser to feed her family. From
the year 1997, she went back and forth from North Korea to China to earn a basic living. Naturally,
her eyes were opened in China, and she learned the reality about South Korea and other countries
in China and realized North Korea was not a proper place to live. Thus, she decided to stay in
China and wondered how she could get her family to join her. After many years of being separated
from his mother, Danny left North Korea in 2004. While he was crossing the Tumen River, he saw
the dead bodies of defectors floating in the river. If the guards captured the defectors, they would
shoot the border crossers to death. Despite the risks, Danny arrived in Northeastern China, and in
2006, he was able to come to the United States. Overall, he was protected under U.S. government
and achieved U.S. permanent residency in 2007. In 2010, he started to share his experiences
through LiNK and got a job at a Korean Newspaper company in California. Now, he wants to play
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a role as a global bridge between North Korean defectors and the outside free world.
I also found an article in the newspaper about one female North Korean refugee in
Washington, DC. Her name is Young-Ae Ma. She used to be a member of a national female
dancing and singing team in North Korea before she crossed the border and stayed in China. While
she was in China, she worked at a Korean community church. However, she was an illegal alien
and Chinese government did not give her any legal status as a resident. Then, she decided to escape,
but she left her son in China and faced the perilous journey to South Korea alone. She arrived in
South Korea in August 2001. However, she decided to leave South Korea because the South
Korean government did not allow her to talk about North Korean civil rights in public. In 2004,
she got a Korean passport and flew to New York to enroll in a language school with a student visa.
While she was in New York, she went to a Korean community church and attended some colleges
to extend her stay in the United States. Then, she got admitted to a theology school in California
and studied there from 2006 to 2009. After graduating, she went to Washington, DC and still lives
there with her husband and son. She did not clearly explain how she got her legal residency in the
United States. Now, she is involved in economic, political, and religious activities. Currently, she
runs a small Korean grocery distribution company with her husband. Also, she became an activist
and tries to educate American society about the horrors of the North Korean regime. “North Korean
human rights are not secure. There is no freedom. The North Korean government contains them
because they don’t want them to have exposure to the outside world” (Gerson 2006).
All of the narratives of North Koreans in the preceding paragraphs are important sources
of data that can be used for developing my thesis. These vivid life experiences, in addition to my
secondary literature references, will be the primary sources for my data gathering methodology.
The data collection from TED Talks and LiNK, as well as the many newspaper articles that I
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collected, will supplement the theme of this paper. Above all, they are the true stories of North
Korean defectors who had to overcome unimaginable hardships during their journeys from North
Korea to their final destinations. Every piece of their testimony is authentic data for my research.
Findings
Humanitarian Disaster in North Korea
In his book, Preparing for the Possibility of North Korean Collapse, Bennett (2013)
indicates that “North Korea suffers from a humanitarian disaster even today: In many parts of the
country it has insufficient food to feed its people, inadequate medicine, and unacceptable water.”
(139). He then illustrates five major contributing factors to why North Korea has been confronted
with this crisis. First, he argues that North Korea has inadequate national supplies due to famine,
a collapsing economy, and impartial economic policies that favor the military and politicians.
Bennett further criticizes the North Korean government by citing its bad behaviors including
“provocations, proliferation, and human right violations which have made North Korea a pariah in
the international community, making many potential donors unwilling to provide” (Bennett 2013:
141). Second, Bennett points out that North Korea has inadequate local supplies. Specifically, “the
North Korean government has taken control of much of the food and other humanitarian supplies
and distributes these supplies with preference to the elites and the military” (Bennett 2013: 141).
Also, transportation is limited in North Korea. The North Korean government terminated its
railroad system, so it is difficult to carry food to other regions. According to Bennett (2013), most
of the food production is geared towards the south of Pyongyang, but most of the population is
concentrated north of Pyongyang. In particular, North Koreans who reside north of the Pyongyang
were most affected by the Great Famine of the mid to late 1990s. In this regard, the regional
disparity is extreme in North Korea. Third, except for elites and members of the militaries, the
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majority of civilians suffer from a lack of individual financial resources, namely money to
purchase food. Yet, the average North Korean incomes are insufficient to feed entire families.
After the government collapse, many people lost their jobs or did not get paid on a regular basis.
Thus, they had to find other routes to acquire food. Fourth, supply disruptions also contributed to
the humanitarian disaster in North Korea. After the Great Famine and the government collapse,
even the limited supply of food of North Korea was further reduced (2013: 141). Moreover, the
North Korean military and elites have made the situation worse by appropriating food and other
supplies, because they control the goods received from the outside world. Up until now, South
Korea and other NGO’s have provided assistances to North Korea in the form of food and money,
however, in most cases, civilians have not been able to receive those goods. Finally, Bennett
mentions North Korean health crisis originated from chronically inadequate food supply and poor
health conditions, which made the population even more vulnerable to diseases. In addition to the
lack of food, the lack of medical care and vaccines have made the humanitarian disaster even
worse.
The above factors, which caused the humanitarian disaster in North Korea, have
significantly contributed to increased North Korean defection. Overall, “Massive refugee flows
are a natural result of humanitarian disaster” (Bennett 2013: 142).
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Figure 1: Humanitarian Challenges after a North Korean Collapse (Bennett 2013: 140)
Who are the North Korean Defectors?
The Great Famine of the 1990s, which resulted in mass starvation, an epidemic of disease,
and death on a mass scale, triggered a wave of defection of North Koreans. “The famine and
continuing economic crisis have had devastating effect on children. Particularly, many North
Korean youths are leaving their country in search for food for their families and for themselves”
(Kim Sook Hyun 2012: 1). A common method of defection is crossing the border into Jilin and
Liaoning in Northeast region of China. After crossing the Chinese border, North Korean defectors
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experience the constant threat of being arrested and repatriated by the Chinese authorities. They
are also exposed to exploitive labor, forced prostitutions, and human trafficking. Since China is a
close ally of North Korea, the government refuses to grant North Korean defectors legal status and
considers them undocumented migrants.
Defectors have fled from North Korea not only as a result of political persecution, but also for
economic reasons driven by hunger, malnutrition, and starvation. Before reaching South Korea,
defectors in China experience constant fear of being repatriated to North Korea based on their
illegal status. “In spite of these hardships and miseries, the defectors cannot return to their
homeland. Even those who crossed the border with the imminent threat of starvation and no
political motivation fear that North Korea will consider them as political turncoat and thus national
traitors” (Kim Sung Ho 2003: 3).
Even if the defectors are educated and brainwashed into resisting foreign influences, many
of them consider escaping from North Korea due to poor living conditions. North Korea’s
deteriorating economy and failure of the Public Distribution System (PDS) in the mid-1990s
resulted in chronic food shortages. Under these circumstances, many North Koreans traveled
around the country to exchange clothes or other resources for food in black markets, which was
prohibited. Furthermore, people began crossing the Tumen River, which makes up roughly onethird of North Korea’s border with China, in search of food and resources. A few months later,
they would slip back to North Korea. In the course of these illegal back-and forth journeys, North
Koreans began to realize that there was a bigger and more prosperous world outside of North
Korea. Indeed, this gave them hopes and dreams of finding a better life. Despite the risk of severe
tortures and even execution to their family members and offspring who remained in North Korea,
the exodus of North Koreans across the Chinese border in search of a new life and freedom has
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surged.
Motivation to defect
For decades, daily life for North Koreans has been a battle to survive from chronic food
shortages, widespread starvation, and economic collapse under a repressive regime. “Refugees
consider leaving their homeland for diverse reasons, some having to do with the ‘push’ factors
associated with deprivation or persecution, others having to do with ‘pull’ factors based on
opportunities in the target countries” (Chang et al. 2008: 5). Overall, hunger and searching for food
were major push factors. However, a Human Rights Report indicated that hunger was only a small
part of the motivation for flight; rather, political factors such as political persecution based on
family history, loss of status, frustration over lack of opportunities, and desire to experience
freedom outside of North Korea were greater motivating factors for escape and defection. The
mid-1990s national food crisis was partly caused by structural issues starting the early 1980s with
North Korea’s food rotating system and successive clamorous natural disasters in North Korea
between 1994 and 1997 (Amnesty International 2004: 6). In fact, North Korea’s Great Famine,
which resulted in a death toll of massive scale, is recognized to be one of the worst famines of the
20th century. After all, the various motives of the defection can be divided into three categories:
simple border-crossers, economic refugees, and political refugees.
Push Factors and Full Factors
In her doctoral thesis titled “Refugees Traumatic Experiences and Solutions” (Seoul; KSCI,
in Korean Language), Hyun Kyung Kim (2009) briefly defined five major push factors why North
Koreans left their homeland: 1) War and political chaos, 2) the risk of punishment for criticizing
the North Korean regime, 3) structural discrimination and persecution based on social caste
system, which still exists in North Korea, restricted to the lower caste from being able to afford
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their living, choose religions, and the opportunity to receive education. Additionally, they had to
cope with constant social tension and fear, 4) economic crisis and poverty, and 5) searching for
scattered family. In general, family unit movement is not easy and costs enormous amount of
broker fees. Thus, in the beginning, one family member would cross the border alone. After one
achieves economic stability in a new place, then he or she invites his or her family members to
live together.
Hyun Kyung Kim (2009) also specified four major pull factors why North Koreans choose
to live in other countries: 1) Security and protection of individual identity, 2) accessibility of
sojourning, 3) better job opportunities in China, even when the available jobs and cheap manual
labor or even prostitution or other undesirable work, 4) the better and higher-quality of education
opportunities. However, it should be noted that illegal migrants are not eligible to receive
education at public schools in China. If defectors are able to pay, they can attend private schools.
Even with all of these complex factors of migration, North Koreans continue to escape to China.
Life in China
Exodus to China
Tens of thousands of North Koreans have fled to China for food, survival, and better life
opportunities since the Great Famine of 1990s. The greatest push factor that impels North Koreans
into China is still the food shortage. China and North Korea are divided by a long and porous
border demarcated by the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The most important official border crossing
points are Sinuiju, which is located in the North Korean province of North Pyongan (DPRK),
which faces Dandong, located in the Chinese province of Liaoning in the West; and Onsong
County in the North Korean province of North Hamyang that faces Tumen, in the prefecture of
Yanbian, in east China. Hyesan, in the North Korean province of Ryanggang, which also borders
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Yanbian, provides another regular exist point into China form the DPRK.
The border region is mountainous, forested and sparely populated. It is easy for North
Koreans to cross at narrow sections of the river, especially in winter, when temperatures reach 40
below zero (Celsius) and the river freezes, and it is possible to walk across. In general, North
Korean defectors seeking sanctuary in China cross the Tumen River into Yanbian (Korean
Autonomous Prefecture) in China. “Because of its large population of Korean-Chinese, North
Koreans have a good chance of finding people in Yanbian with whom they can communicate and
who are willing to provide them shelters and economic support” (Charny 2004: 81). However,
crossing the border and finding help from Korean-Chinese is by no means the end of defection.
Once the defectors reach China, they usually get help from local Korean-Chinese, missionaries,
NGOs, or other organizations. The overwhelming majority (88%) reported receiving help from
Korean-Chinese community directly.
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Figure 2. The map of North Korea, China, and Third Countries (Source: Radio Free Asia; Lee
Shin-Hwa 2013:191)
Refugee Status of North Korean Defectors
The Chinese government policy towards North Korean defectors is based on the
assumption that all North Korean defectors cross the border only for economic reasons. Thus,
border crossers (who are negatively referred to as “wetbacks”) are treated as illegal migrants and
are subject to arrest and deportation. As a consequence, North Korean defectors caught by
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authorities in China have to face repatriation back to North Korea. Although China is a member
of UN Refugee Convention, it does not fully comply with its international obligations. Therefore,
it is difficult for the defectors to seek protection from UNHCR and gain refugee status. “China
cities North Korean refugees as ‘economic migrants’ thereby ignoring their commitment to the
1951 Convention of the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which was signed in 1982. Their
policy on repatriation of refugees belies their claims that it is a country that follows international
law” (Robinson 2010: 10).
Under these adverse laws, Chinese officials, however, have generally ignored the inflow
of North Koreans as long as they keep quiet and do not cause any problems in Chinese society.
Yet, the status of the North Korean defectors has never been changed and they are considered as
illegal migrants. “China does not usually allow North Koreans to apply for political asylum.
Moreover China indicates it is obliged under a bilateral 1986 repatriation agreement with North
Korea to return all border crossers” (Margesson et al. 2007: CRS 11). In this sense, defining the
status of North Korean defectors in China is not simple. Even though North Koreans have defected
due to the economic factors, political reasons cannot be separated from the primary reasons to
defect. According to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), even those who
arrive in search of food may have a claim for refugees status “Sur Place” because they would be
at risk of persecution if they returned. Accordingly, most North Korean defectors in China deserve
to be treated as refugees on the ground that they will be punished or executed by North Korean
regime if they are deported back to North Korea. In the meantime, the Chinese government still
retains an unfavorable political standpoint on refugee issues regarding North Korean defection. It
is clear that China violates its obligations to abide by the principle of non-refoulemnt under the
Refugee Convention Protocol. As a consequence, the coerced repatriation of North Korean
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defectors by China calls for international accusations against China’s bleach of 1951 Refugee
Convention Agreements. However, in order to justify their policy, China constantly argues that
North Korean defectors are largely economic migrants. In other words, China aspires to keep
strong political and economic ties with North Korea. Furthermore, China does not welcome the
large-scale exodus of North Koreans to industrial Northeast China because this region was
historically involved in territorial dispute. Also, China has to deal with the prospects of conflicts
with other minority tribes. “Chinese officials undoubtedly are also concerned that allowing
international groups access could set up an unwanted precedent that could be used in future refugee
scenarios involving other ethnic groups in other parts of China such as Tibetans or Uighurs” (2007:
CRS 12). China does not want the bordering Northeast area to become heavily populated with
North Koreans because they are afraid that it may result in a scenario of minority resistance much
like the situation with Tibetans and Uighurs.
The Plight of North Korean defectors in China
The life of North Korean defectors in China is desperate and plagued with economic and
psychological problems as well as other problems. Once they arrive at Chinese territory, their
plight immediately starts. Their difficulties begin as soon as they set foot in China, as they are
immediately at risk for arrest and deportation. “They have no realistic options to live freely and
meet their basic needs, and the few courageous individuals and organizations seeking to provide
protection and assistance, whether Korean-Chinese, South Koreans, or the rare few from outside
the region, are themselves under constant pressure from the Chinese authorities to curtail their
activities or risk expulsion” (Charny 2004: 83). Under this severe situation, North Korean defectors
are confronted with a diverse array of difficulty because they do not have specific future plans yet.
First and foremost, their primary concern on arrival is finding food and shelter. Most
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refugees begin their lives in China by begging for food and shelter. “Typically they begin by
contacting the local Korean-Chinese who, in many cases are willing to render help, although not
for long” (Chung et al. 2004: 85). A few are able to find shelters in villages and farms where they
are supported by Korean ethnic communities while others find works in the cities engaging in
service industry jobs. However, they are always vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination
owing to their lack of legal status. Some defectors work full-time just for food and shelter without
getting paid. The worst case is that their employers are able to have leverage in their refusal to pay
by threatening to report the North Korean defectors to the authorities. Some Chinese employers
use the excuse that they are short of money or simply promise to pay during the next harvest term.
Females compose the majority North Korean defectors in China; approximately two-thirds
of North Korean refugees are females. From their perspectives, marriage is an instrumental form
of making a living in China. It is estimated that 80% of the female North Korean defectors are
trafficked into forced marriages or channeled into the sex industry. Unfortunately, female North
Korean refugees agree to be sold by traffickers because they desperately want to escape from North
Korea. “The overwhelming majority of North Korean women seeking to stay in China establish
relationship with Chinese men, either through brokers or directly, as a survival strategy” (Charny
2004: 83). To exploit this situation, matchmakers and human traffickers make profits by selling
North Korean women to local Chinese men. They are usually able to convince huger-stricken
North Korean women that they will enhance their life if they marry Chinese men. “There are also
some Chinese men who want to buy North Korean women and use them as hostesses in bars or as
prostitutes” (Chung et al. 2004: 87). Under these circumstances, North Korean women are likely
to lead a highly vulnerable existence in China. The principal reason for this stems from their
unstable status.
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As the Chinese Government deems them to be illegal economic migrants, those caught by
Chinese authorities are deported back to DPRK. All undocumented North Korean women
live with this fear, irrespective of their job, marital status, ties with the Chinese community,
or whether they consented or were trafficked into marriage. Their unfamiliarity of their new
surrounding and inability to communicate in Chinese make them wary of any exposure to
the local community, as such an exposure would make them more vulnerable to detection
and deportation (Mucio 2005: 7).
In addition to those hardships of North Korean females, North Korean children are also
vulnerable to the new unfamiliar environment of China. Since they cannot speak Chinese and are
at the risk of being detected, they hardly ever venture out of their homes, and only a small number
of children have access to education. A few attend church-run schools and even few attend Chinese
schools. In some special cases, families can afford the fee to enroll their children in Chinese
schools. However, as of June 2004, increasing crackdowns by Chinese police forced North Korean
children to stay out of schools to avoid detection. In the worst cases, North Korean children become
separated from their parents. Some of them come to China all by themselves, while others become
separated from their parents while escaping from North Korea. They are commonly found on the
streets begging for food or selling something so they can buy food. Furthermore, job opportunities
for young North Koreans are blocked because of the strict surveillance of Chinese authorities. As
a result, these children of North Korean defectors roam around the streets until they happen to be
rescued by NGO’s or church missionaries, which largely depends on luck. If they are fortunate
enough to get help, they may possibly try to flee to South Korea or other refugee acceptingcountries. In general, the chances of getting help from the South Korean embassy or the South
Korean government are quite slim because of the political and diplomatic relationships between
China and the two Koreas.
With all those economic, social, and status problems, North Korean defectors usually
confront psychological distress because of diverse reasons. “Aside from economic problems,
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North Korean defectors suffer from various psychological problems. One of these problems arises
from the status of being a defector-they live in constant fear of arrest and repatriation. They say
that if they were sent back to North Korea, they would be humiliated, tortured, sent to prison camp
or even executed in public” (Chung et al. 2004: 88-89). Undeniably, the fear of arrest and
deportation is an intrinsic cause of psychological distress among most North Korean defectors
residing in China. Discrimination and prejudice against defectors by local citizens are the other
source of psychological stress. The Chinese tend to treat North Korean defectors as if they were
beggars; sadly, in many cases, that is indeed the case. The last and the most severe psychological
problem among North Korean defectors is the concern about their family members left behind in
North Korea. It has been widely reported that North Korean defectors are labeled as traitors and
thus, their family members left behind in North Korea are constantly under surveillance as the
family members of traitors. Due to those problems, the majority of defectors in China never give
up their dreams to go to South Korea or the United States. However, only a small number of them
are successful in realizing their dreams. According to a survey, 64.3% chose South Korea and
19.1% chose U.S. as their preferred destination for permanent resettlement.
Preferred Destination for Permanent North Korean Resettlement
Destination

Number

Percent (%)

South Korea

802

64.3

United States

238

19.1

China

178

14.3

Others

29

1.3

Total

1,247

100.0

Figure 3: (Chang et al. 2008: Appendix; Table 8)
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Even though North Korean defectors staying in China wish to reach their final destinations,
only a small number successfully accomplish their goals. The main reason stems from the political
attitude of the Chinese government. Thus, various channels of international humanitarian
communities have accused China of breaching refugee convention agreement. Under this political
interest of China, thousands of North Koreans are trying to go to a third country with the hope of
finding asylums for reaching their final destinations.
The Process of Entry into South Korea
As China refuses to grant refugee status to North Korean defectors and considers them
illegal economic migrants, those who wish to move to the final destinations should achieve legal
refugee status. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 to 500,000 of North Korean defectors
live in the Northeastern region of China; of that number, roughly 30,000 to 50,000 wish to settle
in South Korea. However, as mentioned earlier, only small minorities of defectors are able to fulfill
of their wishes. This begs questions, how can defectors successfully find a route to enter South
Korea? In general, there are three ways to enter South Korea, all of which are full of difficulties
and risks. The first, and most obvious route is to visit South Korean embassy and consulates in
China and simply ask for asylum. Although visiting the South Korea-based agencies is accessible,
agencies in China are virtually of no help. North Koreans who request help from South Korean
officials in China become frustrated and disappointed at their cold and neutral gestures. Because
of the political and diplomatic concerns, South Korean officials are practically powerless to assist
their helpless brethren. Again, this goes back to the fact that China does not recognize North
Koreans as refugees due to the diplomatic standpoint with North Korea. Under this disappointing
situation, North Korean defectors cannot help choosing a long escape route to enter South Korea.
As an alternative, some defectors choose moving to third countries where Korean
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embassies and consulates are more favorable to them. “Korean embassies and consulates in ‘third
countries’ such as Thailand and Vietnam appear to be more willing to offer help. The problem
with this route is crossing the Chinese continent, which stretches for over 3,000 miles” (Chung et
al. 2004: 92). An enormous amount of time and money are required to cover this journey and this
does not even fully guarantee being able to enter South Korea. After crossing the border into
Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, or Laos, they are occasionally captured by the local police and
deported to the Chinese police. Thus, they hire guides or brokers who can safely lead them to cities
in third countries where South Korean embassies are nearby. In order to secure the “safe routes”
the defectors have to procure even more money to afford the long journey as well as the bribes for
bordering patrol officers on both sides of the border. In this course of journey, a network of South
Korean, Japanese, American, and European NGO’s offer support to them. “They help set up escape
routes akin to ‘underground railroad’ in the US for slaves seeking freedom in 19 th Century”
(Margessen et al. 2007: CRS 13). Once North Korea defectors arrive at cities such as Bangkok or
Hanoi, they usually contact South Korean embassies or consulates to get help entering South
Korea.
As mentioned earlier, only a small number of North Koreans in China are able to make
their way to third countries to seek asylum. Furthermore, some escape routes through third
countries are difficult because of the uncooperative governments such as Cambodia, Laos,
Vietnam, and Burma. Those governments are unwilling to help the defectors mainly because of
the diplomatic relationships with North Korea. “Cambodia is a party to Refugee Convention and
its Protocol, Laos and Burma are parties to neither, which means they are not all obligated to
provide resources and protection for refugees” (2007: CRS 15). On the other hand, Thailand’s
attitude towards North Korean defectors is more tolerable than those of other Southeast Asian
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countries and cracks down less against North Korean asylum seekers. In fact, Thailand has quietly
cooperated in sending defectors to South Korea for resettlement, but because of the increasing
number of North Korean defectors, Bangkok authorities have begun to intensify the measure to
prevent illegal entry by North Koreans. Indeed, Thailand is not a party to Refugee Convention and
Protocol.
The North Korean “underground railway” through Southeast Asia is a long way full of
perils and hardships passing through hurdle after hurdle on the way to South Korea. Wherever they
may stay, North Korean defectors’ lives are full of fear of getting arrested until they safely land in
South Korea. With the help of South Korean agencies and the NGO’s from all over the world, a
few North Korean defectors are able to finally arrive on South Korean soil where they can start
their new life.
Resettlement in South Korea
The Process of Resettlement in South Korea
After a long and treacherous voyage, North Korean defectors finally arrive at their
destination, South Korea, the Promised Land. Yet, before, they are released into South Korean
society, they are required to take several steps. “Immediately following their arrival at the airport,
they are taken to a facility for investigation and accommodation operated by an intelligence Service
under the Ministry of National Defense” (International Crisis Group 2006: 26). First, they are
interrogated and the National Intelligence Service verifies their identities. They usually stay there
for a month to go through intensive questioning whether they are pure defectors or North Korean
secret agents.
After a month-long stay at the government investigation facility, North Korean defectors
are transferred to a resettlement education center, known as “Hanawon” (House of Unity), which
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was established by the Ministry of Unification (MOU). “The program focuses on social adjustment
education, on site medical care, professional counseling and some basic daily life skills like
driving, computer, and vocational training” (International Crisis Group 2006: 27). Although it
helps the defectors in some ways, on the flip side, this resettlement education center’s functions
are similar to a control and surveillance facility, as defectors are not allowed to go outside of the
facility during their three-month stay. Additionally, males and females live in separated facilities
until they are released into South Korean society. Correspondingly, some defectors criticize the
system, comparing it to another form of refugee camp. They feel that they are restricted, in spite
of having the pursuits for freedom.
At the end of the education and training process at “Hanawon”, the defectors are permitted
to decide where they choose to live and get assistance through a network of private and public
institutions in order to begin their new life in South Korea. At this point, the defectors can select
their favorite regions throughout the Korean peninsula. The majority of them prefer to reside near
the capital city, Seoul, while some prefer southern provinces because they are further from North
Korea. With all the hopes of resettlement in the new places, however, the defectors soon realize
that utopia does not exist anywhere. Lankov (2006) points out in his article, “Bitter Taste of
Paradise” that “From that time forward, the defector is almost completely his or her own and
begins to face challenges of adjustment to a new life” (Lankov 2006: 61).
When a defector decide to move into his or her preferred district, a regional “Hana Center”
assists them closely during the transition and resettlement in the new society. In fact, there are 30
regional Hana Centers in South Korea. As 67% of the defectors have resettled in Seoul or near the
Seoul area, most of the centers are concentrated in Seoul or the cities in the neighboring State of
Gyunggido. Haesun Cho, who worked for the Ministry of Unification explained the basic function
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of Hana Center:
Hana Center is like a supplemental place in which works with North Korean defectors who
have finished the 3-month program at “Hanawon” more closely in their residential areas, so
the center can provide more practical and specific help that North Korean defectors get three
weeks education about the particular regions they live in and get any services or help they
need, such as language, for one year so that they can successfully adjust to their new
residential life and people (Cho Haesun 2010).
As a rule, before the defectors are dispersed to the local Hana Centers, they get support
from South Korean government. In her journal, Tara O (2011) reports the situations as follows:
At the end of their Hanawon stay the government provides additional support to help them
begin their lives in the mainstream South Korean society, in accordance with provisions of
the 1997 Act on Protection and Resettlement Support for the Residents Who Escaped from
North Korea. Under this law, each North Korean adult receives 36,969,000 won (about $
35,260) of which amount $7,245 is for a down payment toward a permanent apartment. (Tara
O 2011: 156).
In addition to this housing program, there are various other kinds of support from South
Korean government to the defectors once they resettle in their own destinations. Each defector has
an assigned counselor, who provides professional guidance, information about job opportunities,
and recommendations for vocational training centers. Other than housing and employment
benefits, there is one more special incentive for young North Koreans’ educations. “The special
Admission System for Expatriates offers extraordinary opportunities to young North Koreans. It
allows North Koreans with high school diplomas to enter universities on a non-competitive basis,
remarkable in South Korean intensely competitive education system” (Tara O 2011: 157). Despite
the high dropout rate, this chance of education is still a great benefit for young North Koreans.
Moreover, the government pays the entire tuition until they complete their bachelor degrees.
Overall, employment, education, medical care, and resettlement money are four basic support that
the defectors usually get from the government. In addition, religious institutions aid the defectors
through voluntary charities. Some enterprises have their own employment programs targeted to
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North Koreans.
The Crisis of Resettlement of North Korean Defectors
Even with so many kinds of different supports from the South Korean government, North
Korean defectors feel marginalized and isolated in the new society of South Korea. Thus,
“assimilation of North Korean into South Korean society has proved especially challenging” (Tara
O 2011: 158). When new defectors arrive in South Korea, most of them are overwhelmed with
their new found freedom, the modernity of South Korea, and the choices they have to make living
a free life as an individual. Under these circumstances, it is natural that defectors should face an
arduous process of adaptation to a new life and culture. “They must redirect the attitude and values
that were formed in North Korea. Then they need to establish new relationships with South
Koreans and assimilate themselves to South Korean systems, customs, and culture” (Suh 2002:
68). On top of that, they have to adapt themselves to the capitalist work environment in order to
find jobs and secure stable sources of incomes. At the same time, they also have to cope with
psychological and emotional adjustment for their new life. However, many defectors have
difficulties to adjust living in the new socioeconomic setting of South Korea. Upon their arrival,
defectors usually have high expectations for their new life in South Korea. Despite the high
expectations, they are quickly confronted by the bitter reality and are discouraged by their
uncertain future. Furthermore, local South Koreans have negative perceptions of the defectors,
viewing them as North Korean agents or troublesome neighbors. As a result, South Koreans are
reluctant to hire and interact with defectors. A language barrier also exists between South Korea
and North Korea. “South Koreans use a large number of English words and use different terms
which are foreign to North Koreans” (Tara O 2011: 159). The defectors also lack experiences and
knowledge in computers and other aspects of modern society in South Korea.
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Interestingly, the problems differed by age group. The majority of young North Korean
defectors have severe difficulties integrating in South Korea. “Their struggles include problems
with schooling and education, social stigmatization, and cultural differences” (Sook Hyun Kim
2012: 4). In general, both North and South Koreans expect younger defectors to fit in without
difficulties in South Korea because both countries share similar linguistic and historical aspects.
However, during the 70 years separation, the two nations have developed the contrasting social
and political structures, which have rendered two separate nations with the different ideologies
and cultures.
One of the most critical problems is the educational gap between the refugee populations
and South Korean adolescents. As the education in North Korea is outdated and distorted, refugees
that come to South Korea are far behind South Korean students. Moreover, they missed several
years of schooling because they spent time in North Korea, China, and sometimes third countries
before entering South Korea. The conditions and crisis in adjustment for the defectors to settle in
South Korea can be classified in four components.
First, North Korean defectors in South Korea are confronted with differences in attitude
and value system. “North Korean defectors perceive South Korean politics, economy, society, and
culture, in terms of their basic knowledge and preconceptions gained while living in the North”
(Suh 2002: 76). As they had been taught to value of equality in the communist society, defectors
had difficulty in understanding the capitalist systems. Even though they become aware of the
difference, they blame the structures of South Korea when they face troubles. Thus, they fail to
understand the fact that responsibility ultimately rests on them. “They think that a liberal
democracy is anarchistic and that in a capitalistic society, money is everything” (Suh 2002: 76).
Second, most of the defectors originating from a low status group of North Korean society
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are poorly educated and unlikely to have useful jobs in South Korea. Their average income is lower
than that of South Koreans. “As the new comers they work at jobs set up by the government, but
they soon quit. Their lack of experience and knowledge in English, Chinese characters, computer,
and other elements of capitalist economy make their work life extremely difficult” (Suh 2002: 78).
Naturally, North Korean defectors in a highly competitive South Korean society are not able to
adjust in the new economic setting in South Korea.
Third, most North Korean defectors in South Korea mostly have to spend a considerable
amount of time under the influence of psychological emotional instability before they are able to
finally resettle into South Korean society. “Maladjustment to the work place and initial anxiety
caused by culture shock can be overcome as defectors become gradually accustomed to the new
life style. Until that time, however, they suffer long-term psychological anxiety” (Suh 2002: 79).
In that case, they have to go through different levels of psychological anxiety over a period of five
to six years until they fully adapt to the life in South Korea. One major psychological crisis stems
from the feeling of guilt about the family left behind in North Korea. They usually suffer from
guilty feelings over the political consequences of their defection. In a way, a number of defectors
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or some other forms of serious depression. To
make the matter worse, when the defectors experience economic failure in South Korea, they not
only regret leaving but also feel guilt about their families left behind in North Korea.
Lastly, “many North Korean defectors also face prejudice from some South Koreans, who
perceive the defectors as socialists who are dependent, passive, lazy, and selfish” (Tara O 2011:
161). Additionally, some South Koreans are not interested in the defectors simply because they
are too busy in the competitive society of South Korea, Thus, the prejudice against the defectors
makes adjusting to the new life even more difficult. However, even all those problems in adjusting
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to a new life in South Korea, a substantial number of North Korean defectors continue to arrive in
South Korea. “Most South Koreans do not understand the difficulty defectors face in integrating
themselves into South Korea, and most do not want to bother. But if such attitudes persists, the
social divisions could contribute to discontent, leading a serious social problems and fractures”
(Tara O 2011: 164). The influx of North Koreans will continue and South Koreans should notice
the change of social structure in the near future, and they should prepare for the possible unification
of Korean Peninsula in the future.
Suggestions for Improvements
North Korean defectors resettling in South Korea experience various difficulties in their
adaption to South Korea society. A majority of them confront obstacles in achieving social,
economic, and psychological transitions into their newly adopted country of South Korea. Above
all, the limited transferability of human capital acquired in North Korea is a great barrier (Yoon
2001: 21). The majority of defectors do not have prerequisite skills or experience to be competitive
in South Korean job markets. As a result, they have difficulties adapting to the new socioeconomic
and political systems of South Korea. On top of that, the prejudice of South Koreans towards
defectors generates more disadvantages for them to get jobs, marry, or to have intimate
interpersonal relationships. “Government support policy, which used to change frequently in the
scope and level of support, fails to establish long-term economic and social foundations for selfsufficiency among defectors” (Lankov 2006: 9). In this manner, what are the ways for
improvement? It is not an easy task for North Koreans to socially adapt in a short period of time.
In short, there are three basic solutions for improving the North Koreans’ adjustment that the
South Korean government should emphasize:
First of all, South Korean government should try to utilize North Koreans’ human resources
by reeducating them according to their education, work experiences, certificates, and skills
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they obtained in North Korea. Secondly, government should make active efforts to provide
protected employment opportunities at least at the initial stage of adjustment. Lastly, to
incorporate defectors into the opportunity structure of mainstream society, government
should expand the diversity of social networks of defectors (Yoon 2001: 24).
As North Koreans were educated in and lived under the communistic ideology, their
education remains strongly ingrained in their minds. They are not familiar with the ideology of a
free democratic society. “Usually, the defectors do not know why they have to work hard in the
South in spite of seeing how wealthy it is compared to North Korea. Believing that equality is the
most important social justice, they insist that no differences in compensation should be permitted”
(Jeon 2000: 369).
As far as the defectors’ maladjustment is concerned, South Korean government should
continue to adjust financial and other support to the defectors to encourage desired behavior,
especially in job searches and continued employment. “For humanitarian reason, we should protect
and support them” (Yoon 2001: 29). In this respect, the government should provide more detailed
and long-term assistance for defectors so as they can get economic independence and sociocultural
integration. To do that, it is advisable that South Korean government apply a policy similar to
“Affirmative Action” in the U.S., which emphasizes giving opportunities to disadvantaged
minority groups.
Despite aid from the government, many North Koreans still struggle to adjust South Korean
society. In reality, their expectations cannot be totally fulfilled, even in what they perceived as the
Promised Land. “They experience serious problems related to jobs, education, crime, and social
adjustment” (Lankov 2006: 1). Occasionally, defectors forget about the misery of their lives back
in North Korea and compare themselves with South Korean neighbors. Consequently, they feel
relatively deprived and easily frustrated. In relation to this matter, the defectors need to change
their mindsets to fully integrate themselves into the host society. A majority of them are perceived
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as passive and too reliant on the government. “While they do not want to be treated like second
class citizens, many prefer to receive government support rather than work. Further, many
defectors view blue-collar jobs as demanding and consider such labor beneath them” (Suh 2002:
84). In a way, the defectors themselves must remove their sense of dependency and develop
objective and realistic judgments of their capabilities and opportunities available to them. “In this
respect, it is imperative to re-establish a proper relationship between defectors and South Korean
society in changing environment” (Yoon 2001: 22).
Correspondingly, South Koreans should admit the fact that social integration of North
Koreans is part of the inevitable process of making one Korea. Nevertheless, South Koreans’
prejudice against North Korean defectors make it even harder for the latter to adjust to the life in
South Korea. In particular, stereotyping North Koreans as socialists who are dependent, lazy, and
selfish is a pervasive misconception among South Koreans. Thus, South Koreans should keep in
mind that “prejudices and accompanying acts of discrimination of the host country people have
negative impacts on the self-concept and mutual health of traumatized refugees or victims” (Jeon
2000: 370). Above all, South Koreans need to learn to respect and empathize with the defectors’
previous lives in the North and not to simply denounce them as meaningless and shameful. Instead,
South Koreans should eliminate their prejudice and accept their brethren.
North Korean Refugees in the United States
Departure
After escaping from North Korea, the defectors stay in China with hopes of moving to their
final destination. Presumably, most of them want to go to South Korea because of linguistic and
cultural familiarity, as well as resettlement benefits from the South Korean government. However,
as Cohen at Brookings indicated “some would like to go to the U.S. because of its varied economic
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and educational opportunities” (Cohen 2001: 2). Other than this primary reason, others may simply
wish to get away from the discrimination, which North Koreans confront in South Korea.
However, a practical reason for the desire to move to U.S. is the influence of social networks,
which are often religiously affiliated NGO’s, or some family members or friends who have already
settled in the United States. With all those privileges for resettlement in South Korea, “some still
choose United States either because they have been turned off of South Korea by stories of
discrimination of North Korean defectors or because they feel after overcoming difficulties such
as language barrier, the opportunities for success would be greater in the United States” (The Bush
Institute: 2014: 7). The Bush Institute simply summarizes the factors motivating North Korean
refugee to come to the United States as follows:
The five factors are an influential advisor with in transit, often pastors/ priests, a family
member or friend who had already resettled in the United States, interaction with other
refugees indention/hiding/holding, interactions with diplomatic or humanitarian
personnel, and other factors such as wait time also influenced destinations (2014: 8).
In general, North Korean defectors usually take the route to a third country in Southeast
Asia where they have a chance to ask asylum to the U.S. government. Unfortunately, they usually
have to be on a waitlist from six months to even more than a year before they get the final approval
of refugee status from U.S. embassy. They occasionally find the waiting period too long and
eventually withdraw their applications for asylum in the United States and instead go to South
Korea. “In one extreme case, a defector was warned in advance on his way to Thailand that the
wait for admission to the United States could be very long, so he took an unusual and much more
arduous journey from Thailand on his own through South America and Mexico” (The Bush
Institute 2014: 8).
Not many North Korean defectors realize that the United States has adopted the policy of
the North Korean Human Rights Acts (NKHRA) in 2004 by Bush administration. Although South
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Korea is the country of choice for most defectors, NKHRA, which was passed by U.S. Congress,
opened up new opportunities for North Korean defectors to settle in the United States. Even though
the number of refugees who are granted to asylum is meager, North Koreans will increasingly
make efforts to resettle in the United States at any cost. However, in reality, among those North
Koreans who arrive in Southeast Asia from China en route to South Korea, many of them do not
know that there are opportunities to go to the United States along with the benefits, which are
offered by U.S. government.
Arrival
After enduring untold hardships, a few North Korean defectors finally arrive in the host
country of the United States. The arrival process is usually assisted by NGO’s. Yet, North Koreans
have to go through the bureaucratic entry process of the U.S. government to have a new life in the
land of opportunity. While North Korean refugees are appreciative of the assistance they receive
in the course of arrival at the U.S., they sometimes compare their conditions with those of the
North Koreans in South Korea, where their assistance from the South Korean government is more
uniform and predictable.
Once they arrive in the U.S., the refugees enjoy a short period of settlement during which
time they find housing, take care of medical needs, make connections with the local Korean
community, and take English classes. After they are sent to resettlement destination, they get help
from the state government, which has different benefit packages for the refugees. They usually
receive about $300 in cash, health insurance, and food stamps from the state for almost eight
months. They are also provided with English education and job offers. After about a year of living
in the U.S., the refugees are granted permanent residency and are also eligible to apply for
citizenship after five years. In this regard, English language training is indispensable to adjust to
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the new life. However, “upon reaching the United States, refugees must quickly find employment
and become self-sufficient. This leaves little time to study English, a necessary tool to find better
employment and to assimilate into American society” (The Bush Institute 2014: 2). They also
desperately need transportation to pursue a basic level of independence. Yet, they have to rely on
friends or community members for help. As far as health insurance goes, they commonly have
little understanding of how insurance policies work, and they often do not even notice that their
free health insurance has expired before they have an opportunity to take advantage of it.
Upon arrival, some of the refugees make the most of the support from the government,
civil society, and individual actors. Thus, they come to believe the help they receive despite the
challenges they face allow them to quickly achieve economic independence. Still, others believe
that outside help is scarce and that it is insufficient to help them achieve even a minimal standard
of financial independence. Despite new challenges, most of the refugees are satisfied with their
decisions to come to the U.S., and they realize in the long run that the opportunities for success
are plentiful.
Most of the North Korean refugees eventually end up living within Korean communities
scattered in the United States. This is not surprising since the linguistic and cultural familiarity
with the Korean immigrants is more than enough to attract them into the diaspora. They can easily
get support from Korean ethnic churches and Korean-American NGO’s in the Korean community.
Furthermore, they can get jobs in Korean communities without language problems. Besides, when
new North Korean refugees arrive in the U.S., they try to get in touch with other refugees who
have already settled in Korean communities. They often live together in order to get some help
and support from those who arrived earlier than them. In some ways, other Koreans in the
community may discriminate them against, but the discrimination is not as severe as in South
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Korea. They may simply feel they are looked down or pitied by other Koreans, most of whom
experience similar feelings when they first come to the United States. Overall, churches naturally
become central part of most North Korean refugees’ lives. Some of them are devoted to the religion
while others just use the religious institutions only for the sociocultural functions. In particular,
when they are sick, church members usually arrange pickup and treatment by Korean doctors
almost without any cost. Outside of the church community, refugees usually ask for help to NGO’s
for help when it comes to government-related tasks, including procuring official documents or
getting health checkups.
Under these circumstances, some young North Korean refugees are lucky enough to be
full-time students. “However, this was possible only for those who were relatively young when
they arrived and came with their parents or those who were placed with a host family that could
bear a substantial portion of their living costs” (Bush Institute 2014: 2). Even so, they still face
difficulties in acclimating to student culture and classes that are conducted in English.
Consequently, they have better chances of broadening the range of social connections outside the
Korean community and adapting more fully and quickly to their new life in the United States.
However, even with all those positive aspects of North Koreans’ resettlement in the U.S., there is
also a flip side. Some of them happen to lead miserable lives, and cold hard truth for many is that
the “American dream” is far from reality. As is the case for many North Koreans who resettle in
South Korea, real life in this land is harsher than they dreamed of during the course of their
treacherous journey. In fact, some North Korean defectors come to the U.S. with the aid of brokers,
many of whom are Korean-Chinese or overseas South Koreans. After resettlement, North Korean
refugees have to pay $6,000 for the broker fees. This is very burdensome, as many refuges usually
engage in minimum-wage menial jobs, which barely cover the rent and food costs, much less
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money to pay back debts. The “cost of defection” is the first obstacle to overcome for these kinds
of refugees. On the other hand, there are some others who are eager to learn English and attend
college to get decent jobs. In some cases, refugees become U.S. citizens and enjoy their successful
lives. There are two sides to every coin.
Problems of adaptation in the United States
In the introduction of this paper, I indicated that in recent years, increasingly more North
Korean defectors prefer to resettle in North America than South Korea. Kyung-hwa Song (2012)
indicates that 1,194 North Koreans chose the United States and European countries as their final
destination for refugee status or exile, while 2,376 chose South Korea. In other words, one in three
North Korean defectors is heading to the countries other than South Korea. In fact, the United
States has emerged as the main destination for North Korean defectors since 2006.
Cohen (2011) argues that there are many barriers to the State Department’s commitment
to increased reception of North Korean refugees. She suggests four basic obstacles that the U.S.
government to curb North Koreans from entering the U.S.:
First America’s general attitude is that North Korean refugees should be going to South Korea
because of their shared ethnicity, language, culture, and history. Second, there has been
misinterpretation of the South Korean Constitution that United States officials have rendered all
defecting North Koreans as ineligible for refugee status in the United States. Third, there is a long
delay taken for the United States to process North Korean applications and have sought
resettlement in South Korea instead. Lastly, the attitude of other governments such as China also
presents an obstacle because they are hesitant to let the United States establish refugee
resettlement program in their countries, which would flood these nations with refugees and
potentially strain their delicate relations with the unpredictable Pyongyang (Cohen 2011: 3).

Even with all those political obstacles of the U.S. government, North Korean defectors are
still eager to resettle in the United States because of the pull factors of this rich country. However,
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adaptation and assimilation to the new environment of the United States can be even harder than
that of South Korea. Some young North Korean defectors often come out in the media or talk
shows and share their successful life stories in the United States, but there are many negative
stories that do not get much publicity. “North Koreans who are resettled in the United States mostly
struggle to adjust a new language and culture” (GAO Report 2010: 44). Even in South Korea,
North Koreans face difficulties with Korean language due to the difference in dialects. In the U.S.,
they face even more extreme language barriers, not to mention cultural differences. Under these
circumstances, some North Koreans face physical health problems and psychological distress, and
socioeconomic problems. “Some of them arrive in the United States in poor health and have
suffered from traumatic and stressful experiences” (GAO Report 2010: 44). In addition to those
problems, they also have issues related to working in South Korean ethnic communities in major
U.S. cities. There have been several incidents in Koreatowns where North Koreans were treated
badly by South Koreans and ended up taking their own lives because they were unable to deal with
the shame and stress. North Koreans are discriminated against in Korean ethnic communities
because of their own low socioeconomic and occupational status. On the other hand, most South
Korean immigrants do not show interests in North Koreans, and most employers tend to see them
merely as manual laborers. In this context, North Koreans cannot fully join the mainstream of
Korean ethnic communities.
Alongside all of those negative aspects of North Korean defectors’ resettlement in the U.S.,
there has been a considerable increase in the number of young female defectors who have resettled
successfully. Their success narratives have spread among young North Korean defectors in China
as well as in South Korea. Surprisingly, the illegal entries of North Korean defectors have been
frequently reported in Canada and the United States. As a consequence, new types of illegal
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brokers have already emerged and have started to exploit the North Koreans in South Korea who
wish to move to the United States. This phenomenon indicates that the pull factors of the U.S. are
stronger than those of South Korea. The U.S. undoubtedly attracts many North Korean defectors
and, this trend will continue in the future. Therefore, efforts to resolve the political obstacles for
the resettlement of North Korean defectors in the U.S. should be pursued. Also, support for the
North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) should be enhanced for the sake of future North
Korean defectors in the United States.
U.S. Government Policy on North Korean Refugees
The U.S. has a history of admitting refugees of special humanitarian concern into the
country. After the World War II, more than 600,000 displaced European entered the United States.
Some years later, the U.S. granted asylum to people fleeing communist countries during the Cold
War era. In 1975, the U.S. government has resettled over 3 million refugees from all over the
world. According to a report from Congressional Research Service on “Refugee Admissions and
Resettlement Policy”,
The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement here are authorized by the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The 1980 Act
had the basic purposes: (1) to provide a uniform procedure for refugee admissions: and (2) to
authorize federal assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency. The incident
of the legislation was to end an ad hoc approach to refugee admissions and resettlement that had
characterized U.S. refugee policy since World War II (Bruno 2015: 1).
Under this refugee policy, the annual number of refugee admissions and allocation of these
numbers by region of the world are set by the President after consultation with Congress (Bruno
2015: 1). Following congressional consultations on the Administration’s proposal, the President
issues a Presidential Determination to set the refugee numbers for that year. In actual process of
refugee resettlement in the U.S., it is clear that there are three refugee-processing priorities. Priority
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one covers refugees for whom resettlement seems to be the appropriate durable solution, who are
referred to U.S. refugee program by UNHCR, a U.S. embassy, or a designated NGO. Priority two
covers groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States. It includes specific groups that
may be defined by their nationalities, clans, ethnicities, or other characteristics. Priority three
covers family reunification cases. Refugee applications under priority three are based upon an
“affidavit of relationship (AOR)” filled by an eligible relative in the United States (Bruno 2015:
5). Refugees are admitted to the U.S. via the Refugee Act of 1980 and potential refugees are
screened outside the United States. In fact, more than 2 million refugees have arrived in the U.S.
since the Refugee Act of 1980. Normally, they arrive in the U.S. and are sent to their resettlement
destinations. Unlike immigrants who plan their new life in the U.S. most refugees arrive under
very different circumstances. “Forced out their home countries, often living in transitional quarters
like temporary camps or housing in foreign countries, they often experience fear and uncertainty
as they make their way to safe place” (Singer and Wilson 2006: 2).
In the long run, refugees wind up living in U.S. communities. It is a multi-layered process
that involves U.S. and international public and private entities. As previously indicated, the priority
system is used to identify those most in need of resettlement. In this context, “the U.S refugee
resettlement program aims to promote early economic self-sufficiency among refugees. Many
local organizations and volunteers work with refugees to assist in getting them acclimated” (Singer
and Wilson 2006: 6). Unlike immigrants who enter U.S. through family or employment ties,
refugees are admitted on humanitarian grounds, and there is no requirement that they should
demonstrate economic sufficiency. In this sense, U.S. government set up the measures to help
refugees resettle. “The Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human
Services provides funds to participating states and voluntary agencies “Volags” (and their local
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partners) to provide assistance with housing, employment, language learning, and other services
for four to eight months after arrival” (Singer and Wilson 2006: 4). As previously mentioned, more
than 2 million refugees have arrived in the U.S. since the Refugee Act of 1980, and refugees have
been mostly in metropolitan areas with large foreign-born populations. With the help of local,
state, and federal government, they can lead socioeconomically successful lives.
U.S. Government Policy on Vietnamese Refugees and its lessons
After the collapse of Saigon in 1975, large number of Vietnamese refugees (boat people)
arrived in the United States to start new lives. There have actually been several different waves of
Vietnamese migration:
First wave was the group of refugee made up of South Vietnamese government officials who were
U.S. related personnel. The second wave was the group of boat people who were mostly SinoVietnamese. The third wave was occurred in the early 1980s. This group consisted of boat people
as well as those leaving Vietnam under the U.S. Orderly Departure Program. Then in the early
1990s, another large group of refugees reached the American shore under the U.S. Humanitarian
Operation Program (Zhou and Bankston 2000: 4).
Through those various waves, more than 2 million Vietnamese people have resettled in the
United States. Vietnamese are now fifth largest Asian immigrant group in the United States. In the
mid-1990s, the Vietnamese refugee flight subsided. As a result, the arrival of the Vietnamese has
become a part of regular family sponsored immigration (Singer and Wilson 2006: 4).
Overall, the tragic exodus of Vietnamese refugee played a critical role in the crafting of
current U.S. immigration policies. The U.S. government, motivated by feelings of responsibility
for a situation generated by its own military intervention, developed its new refugee policies in
coordination with UNHCR. “Because the numbers of Vietnamese refugees admitted to the United
States were so large, the U.S. government has to establish an Office of Refugee Resettlement. This
system was later expanded in order to handle the resettlement of many other groups” (Campi
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2006). Nevertheless, U.S. refugee policies have an ad hoc character, developed as a series of
responses to unforeseen and changing policies. Zhou and Bankston (2000) indicated the main
points of the U.S. government policies on refugees as follows:
The Refugee Act of 1980 became the most comprehensive piece of refugee legislation in U.S.
history. In place of the ‘Seventh Preference Category’ established in 1965, which admitted
refugees as part of the total number of immigrants allowed into the United States, the Refugee Act
provided for an annual number of admissions for refugees, which was designated independent of
the number of immigrants admitted and was to be established each year by the president in
consultation with Congress. The legislative Act, then, became a policy of refugee resettlement,
reflecting a continuing process, rather than a mere reaction to specific emergency events (Zhou
and Bankston 2000: 7).
Under the influence of the Refugee Act of 1980, refugees are sponsored by the U.S.
Government or voluntary agencies (Volag) to resettle in the United States. The government
assisted the Volags in helping refugees resettle in designated locations. The Volags were private
charitable organizations under contract to the U.S. government. Although the government set the
general outline of refugee policy, the volunteer agencies were largely charged with implementing
that policy. (Zhou and Bankston 2000: 9)
Then, what are the lessons of U.S. Vietnamese refugee policy, which can be applied to the
U.S. government policy on North Korean refugees? Overall, Vietnamese refugee policy cannot
simply be applied to North Korean refugee policy because the circumstances are different. The
former was the result of war and political repression, while the latter has largely been brought
about by the North Korean famine during the 1990s. Thus, U.S. has different interests with respect
to the refugee issues of the two countries. Conspicuously, the U.S.’s interest in the North Korean
refugees is less compelling than those of Vietnamese refugees. Furthermore, the U.S.’s sense of
responsibility for Vietnamese refugees cannot be compared to that of North Korean refugees.
“However, the passing of NKHRA indicates that the United States is willing to take leadership in
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implementing the permanent resettlement of North Korean refugees in a manner similar to what it
did during the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s” (Ji 2011: 58). After all, it is clear that
the Vietnamese refugee policy, which was based on the American tradition of humanitarianism,
can offer valuable lessons for improving the North Korean refugee policies.
U.S. Government Policy on North Korean Refugee
The U.S. government had little concern about North Korean refugees until 2002, when
several North Koreans, aged sixteen to nineteen, entered the U.S. consulate in Shenyang, China
and requested asylum. When they were refused, they demonstrated with a hunger strike to promote
international attention, and the refugees eventually resettled in South Korea. As a consequence,
this event initiated much interest all over the world. After the incident, U.S. Congress began
debating what role the U.S. should play in terms of human rights in North Korea. “In June 2002,
the House of Representative passed a resolution that called on China to stop the forced repatriation
of North Korean refugees and allow UNHCR access to them” (Hallet 2006: 79).
In 2004, President George W. Bush signed the North Korean Human Rights Act
(NKHRA). The act mandates the appointment of special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea.
However, North Korean refugees’ human rights did not seem to improve much. The main reason
was the lack of information about the situation of North Korean refugees. Furthermore, NKHRA
did not have strong intentions to enhance the dire situation of the refugees for various reasons.
Accordingly, “the Act has been ineffective in creating opportunities for more than a handful of
North Koreans to resettle in the U.S. Fewer than twenty have been designated as refugees or
granted asylum” (International Crisis Group 2006: 27). However, in the spring of 2006, resettling
in the U.S. went from being an elusive dream to a real option for North Korean asylum seekers.
“NGOs and senators advocating human rights had a series of triumphs in 2006, centered on North
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Korean Freedom Week activities they have organized annually since 2004. President Bush met
with defectors and the family members of abductees, describing his time with them as ‘one of the
most moving meetings’ of his presidency” (International Crisis Group 2006: 28).
Jane Kim (2008) summarizes the political nature of NKHRA, and further indicates four
practical challenges to the implementation of NKHRA itself:
First, the implications of the Act created high expectations of the federal government
amongst potential beneficiaries without the proper procedures and system in place to
realize the Act’s mandates. Second, a number of funding issues arouse. Funding for such
purposes as human rights and democracy programming was previously issued from
multiple sources. As these sources were allowed to continue appropriating funds for
existing projects, there was little incentive to switch funders and apply for NKHRA
appropriations. The third reason is the sensitivity when dealing with other countries hosting
North Korean refugees within its border. These countries are hesitant because of the
potential tension with North Korea. Lastly, the implementation of NKHRA was hindered
by the political nature of the process itself. Congressional members often had their own
political motivations for supporting the legislation, including garnering the
administration’s compliance to their own U.S.-North Korea Priorities (Kim Jane 2008:
153).
Despite the challenges in implementing NKHRA, there were notable events regarding
North Korean human rights and refugees. On May 13, 2008, the U.S. House of Representative
amended NKHRA via North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act. “The bill renews funding
and adjusts the original 2004 provisions for the Special Envoy and the U.S. resettlement of North
Korean refugees while criticizing the slow implementation of the original bill” (Kim Jane 2008:
154). Furthermore, in September 2008, the first instance of a North Korean refugee resettled in the
United States receiving permanent residency without an interview occurred. Moreover, other
North Korean defectors in the United States have also applied for permanent residency. This was
a dramatic shift in NKHRA. “This case was still important because it showed that North Koreans
in the United States were following through with the refugee resettlement program and actively
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pursuing opportunities provided by government” (Kim Jane 2008: 155).
The election of President Barack Obama marked a change in U.S. policy on North Korean
refugees. In particular, President Obama has shown willingness to consider bilateral talks with
North Korea to improve relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, North Korean human
rights issues seem to be overshadowed by the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue. Although
President Obama has his hands full with domestic and foreign policy challenges, he also has
obligation as a world leader to help North Korean refugees. He not only has to do his best to free
the oppressed North Koreans but also help North Korean refugees resettle successfully in the
United States. In this respect, the U.S. government still needs to improve the resettlement programs
so that North Korean refugees overcome the challenges confronted in their new life in this Land
of Opportunity.
Ways for Improving North Korean Refugees’ Resettlement in the U.S.
North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and in South Korea come from an
isolated society with limited or no experience with capitalism and thus, they are susceptible to
economic difficulties. They usually encounter difficulties in finding jobs and affording basic living
expenses. In particular, North Koreans who are resettled in the U.S. have to struggle more because
of the new language and different culture. In this respect, the U.S. Government should find a way
to increase the number of North Korean refugees and support them as valuable human resources.
To begin with, the State department should explore more intensively with South Korea, as
requested by Congress, ‘all possibilities’ for resettling North Koreans in the United States prior to
becoming South Korean citizens. U.S. embassies and consulates in Southeast Asian countries
could help by featuring prominently on their websites materials in Korean for prospective asylum
seekers and refugees so that they are aware of possibilities for resettling in the United States could
and should do more (Cohen 2011: 5).
In this way, the U.S. government can secure more prospective North Korean refugees at
the point of defection in Southeast Asian countries. “To help North Korean refugees more
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smoothly resettle in the United States, the government should undertake a review of how North
Koreans are faring under its current resettlement program” (Cohen 2011: 5). Thus, the resettlement
problems including English language skills, employment, and housings should be reviewed in a
humanitarian manner. “A government review could not only improve the lives of North Koreans
already here but could help in planning for larger numbers, especially if there is a collapse in North
Korea and a need for international burden sharing” (Cohen 2011: 5). If that should happen, the
U.S. government should expect a large influx of North Korean refugees, and prepare to receive
them as they did in the time Vietnamese Boat People.
Helping persecuted and impoverished North Koreans who are ready to risk their lives to
escape one of the most repressive regimes on this planet is the indispensable duty of the United
States. “The United States could and should do more” (Cohen, 2011: 5). Collaboration with Korean
government, NGO’s, Korean ethnic communities in major U.S. cities, and religious groups is
essential factor to improving the treatment of North Koreans in the United States. In addition, the
education of young North Koreans will be the foremost issue in improving the social status of
North Korean refugees. As part of a future generation of the U.S. society, young North Koreans
will play an essential role and contribute to the national interests of the United States. It is expected
to establish distinctive North Korean ethnic enclaves in the “salad bowl” society of the U.S. in the
future. Thus, new theories of migration and assimilation should be constructed to accommodate
North Koreans.

52

Conclusion and Discussion
Why do North Koreans cross the border? The answer is quite simple because they are hungry.
Yet, it is not so simple to explain or define the complexity of reasons for North Koreans’ defection.
The movement of North Korean defectors is arduous and full of perils. The defection of North
Koreans seems to be voluntary, but ultimately, it is a forced migration. Above all, the general
hypothesis in this paper that increasingly more North Koreans will cross the border of China and
thus come to South Korea or the United States has been proven to be true based on the data and
findings of this research. However, the increasing number of North Korean defectors has generated
various political and social issues in China, South Korea, and the U.S.
North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world despite their manufacturing capacity
for nuclear weapons. In his article “North Korea and Subversive Truth,” Lankov argues that North
Korea is the model of a “failed state” (Lankov 2008: 1). Under the control of the most secluded
and brutal government in the world, many North Koreans risk their lives to escape hunger and
depression. Yet, the desire to make their life better supersedes the threat of the oppressive and
violent regime.
North Korean defection is composed of complex factors and it is not so simple to clearly
define the multitude of reasons for defection. It entails a combination of forced migration and
voluntary movement, or to put it another way, North Korean defection is composed of “opportunity
willingness and menu-choices” (Young-hoon Song 2013: 85). Song criticizes the journalists
because they generalize and over-simplify North Korean defection as being only a matter of
economic migration. Without a doubt, political reasons cannot be the primary motive for defection.
Rather, the economic reason is the major factor in their decision to defect. However, when it comes
to the refugee status issue, North Korean defectors can still prove the fact that they fled North
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Korea because of the political reasons. Becoming a defector or a refugee is a matter of life or death
for North Koreans who wish to flee their home country.
In fact, “defector” is not a sociological term. This term is widely used by journalists who
focus on muckraking human rights abuse issues. Shin-Hwa Lee (2013) briefly explains the term,
which refers to “individual who have fled North Korea” (2013: 185). Bell (2012) also indicates
that the term “defector” has hidden meanings, such as “traitor” and “reactionary.” For this reason,
North Korean refugees do not like this term because it has negative connotations. However, the
status of defector also refers to the stage before getting official approvals as asylum seekers in
other countries; it refers to people who fled their home country in the process of escaping to other
places for resettlement.
To this point, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (2013) clarifies the definition of
refugee under the section 101(a) (42) of the INA (Immigration and Nationality Act).
Any person who is outside of country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (INA:
101(a) (42); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2013: 9).
To meet refugee status, the defectors must “establish that he or she is unable or unwilling to
return to his or her country because of past or feared persecution” (INA 2013: 18). In general,
“refugees have an experience with political oppression and violence, flight rather than departure,
and exile instead of access to the homeland” (Hein 1995: 153). After all, they should “meet the
requirement of being forced to leave owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted reasons
before a decision can be made whether an individual asylum seeker is granted refugee status” (Lee
Shin-Wha 2013: 190). Lee Shin-Wha also points out that economic difficulties and food crisis are
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not sufficient to support to achieve refugee status in third countries. Even the definition of refugee
largely emphasizes the state of refugee to those who cope with the fear of political persecution.
“People who flee persecution and then cannot return to their homeland for a long period of time
are refugees” (Hein 1995: 1).
Under the terms of the 1980 Refugee Act, State Department’s political division usually asks
a few questions to judge whether to recognize someone as a refugee or not (Garcia 2006). For
example, “Why are you different from everyone else in your country? How have you been singled
out, threatened, imprisoned, tortured, harassed?” (Aguayo and Fagen 1984: 369; Garcia 2006: 89).
Above all, asylum seekers should “provide evidence of a ‘clear probability’ of persecution, which
was often impossible to prove” (2006: 89). In this respect, it is true that the North Korean defectors
have suffered from fear of persecution in North Korea based on political dictatorship. As they are
not willing to return to their homelands, they should naturally earn refugee status in third countries.
Historically, the U.S. supported Indochinese resettlement in 1954 not only for the support
of “rebuilding war-torn economies and cementing ties among the new allies” (Barnet 1983; Hein
1995: 12), but also for their own benefit, in order to enhance their international reputation and
display national power. Despite those efforts, the U.S. limits the number of how many North
Koreans it accepts due to the traumatic experience from 9/11 terrorist attacks and risk of nuclear
weapons and missiles. Thus, it is believed that once they approve accepting a large number of the
North Korean defectors, the U.S. will be more vulnerable to the communists and the terrorists from
North Korea. “Safeguarding civil liberties, due process, and human rights is often trumped in the
name of national security” (Garcia 2006: 12). In other words, United States keeps its “immigration
ceilings high” (Strand 1985: 141) for North Korean defectors. To this stern standpoint of U.S.
policy, I argue that the U.S. government should establish a more pro-active approach to resolve
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the North Korean refugee crisis. Above all, the humanitarian spirit of NKHRA as well as UNHCR
is the basis of humanitarianism in the “the nation of immigrants”.
All in all, North Korea, China, South Korea, and the United States each have their own role
in resolving the North Korean refugee issue. Thus, the four countries involved in this issue should
make an effort to improve the situation, and occasionally endeavor to collaborate to find the better
solution. More than anything else, North Korea should look squarely at the reality of the outside
world and cease being a reclusive hermit kingdom. It is evident that North Korea’s unclear nuclear
ambition exacerbated its isolation from the rest of the world. As a consequence, its economy has
been deteriorated and its people are suffering from hunger. To diffuse the crisis in North Korea,
China, South Korea, and the United States should use friendly persuasion to motivate North Korea
to pursue their own economic restoration by establishing trade and diplomatic relations with other
nations, particularly other countries in East Asia.
On the other hand, the South Korean government and its people should admit that North
Koreans are not very good at adjusting to South Korean society. In particular, many South Koreans
consider North Korean defectors as a social burden and a political irritant in relation to the North
Korean regime. Lankov indicates, “The defectors’ experience testifies to the persistent and deep
distinctions between the peoples of the two Koreas. This experience confirms that the unification
of the two Korean states will be not only costly, but also socially difficult” (Lankov 2009: 19). In
fact, South Korean government has failed to maintain a consistent policy towards North Korean
refugees due to the changes in the presidency. Undoubtedly, the basic rule of policy towards North
Korea and its refugees should be based on the principle that Korea is just one country.
On the whole, the crisis of North Korean defectors in China mainly stems from China’s
negligence of the UNHCR agreement. As indicated previously, although China is a member of the
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U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol, it does not comply with its obligation. Thus, as
undocumented migrants, North Korea defectors suffer from various problems in China. They have
no legal protection and live in constant fear of arrest and deportation. To solve this plight of North
Korean defectors, Chinese authorities should, first of all, reevaluate their obligation of UNHCR
and try to set up a new policy over battered North Koreans based on human rights. They should
also take a broader macro view that complying with their UNHCR obligation will ultimately be
good for their national interests. Granting the refugee status to North Korean defectors will not
only give “Great China” a chance to demonstrate its generosity regarding human rights, but also
enhance its reputation as a world superpower. In doing so, China stands to gain prestige in the
international community. Perhaps more importantly, it will play a positive role in Asia and the
world.
As was mentioned in the hypotheses of this paper, increasingly more North Korean defectors,
especially young generation, will choose to come to the United States rather than South Korea.
However, it is clear that the U.S. government has not prepared for the large influx of North Koreans
due to complex political reasons. In fact, there are many scenarios in which a large number of
North Koreans will one day reach American shores, just like Vietnamese refugees did several
decades ago. The North Korean refugee issue is a serious one, but the number of those who have
successfully attained refugee status is too small. It is noteworthy that North Korean refugees in
this “land of immigrants” will contribute to valuable human capital to U.S. society. In this respect,
the U.S. government should establish a more solid policy other than NKHRA.
North Korean defection is not the only problem caused by the separation of Korea. “It
raises important policy issues, most centrally not only for China and South Korea, but also for
the United States, the U.N. and other concerned parties” (Akaha 2013: 172). In this sense, the
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refugee crisis should be considered from the standpoint of international law (Lee Shin-Wha
2006). Most of all, the international community should understand and identify the reason why
North Korean defectors seek asylum. Even today, somewhere along the Chinese-North Korean
border, some North Koreans are crossing the Tumen River in search of their better lives far from
persecution and starvation of their home country regime. I hope that the plight of North Korean
defectors is well described in this paper so it can capture the attention of the free world. As the
North Korean defectors’ issue can be a pioneering research in relation to migration theories, I
hope that my research will make a small contribution to the sociological field. Overall, the major
purpose of this study lies in understanding the situation faced by North Korean defectors in
China, South Korea, and the United States. More specifically, I put focus on the future aspects of
the new influx of North Koreans into those three related countries. I believe the findings of this
study will be the basis for my future research on North Korean defectors.
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